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How did state legislatures elect U.S. senators before the 17th Amendment was ratified in 
1913?  How were nominees chosen?  How much of the election was actually secured before the 
formal balloting began, in popular canvasses?  In popular primaries?  In legislative caucuses?  
How did multi-ballot election contests get resolved?    
The purpose of this paper is to begin us down the path of answering questions such as 
these.  Questions about the election of senators before 1914 have been asked in the past, but 
rarely have the answers been comprehensive and systematic.  Recent research by Engstrom and 
Kernell (2003) has begun to pose a similar set of questions at the national level, with a focus on 
the interaction of presidential and Senate elections.  Here, we offer a different perspective, by 
focusing more directly on the state legislatures where the elections were actually held. 
Before the ratification of the 17th Amendment in 1913, the electoral scheme for the U.S. 
Senate was the most obvious formal manifestation of federalism in the national government.  
Even though all elections to federal office were (and are) predicated on state governments 
standing between citizens and Washington, only U.S. senators were chosen directly by state 
officials.  Reformers of a century ago were interested in limiting the role of state legislatures in 
Senate elections for many reasons.  There was a general sense among the reformers (and many in 
the elite press) that the role of the legislature as a responsible and effective intermediary for the 
citizenry to choose their senators had been severely compromised.  No one single motivation 
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dominated, but a combination of bribery scandals, electoral deadlocks, mal-apportioned 
legislatures, and changing political tastes conspired to make direct election a popular choice at 
the turn of the century.1    
More than half a century elapsed from the passage of the 17th Amendment to the first 
scholarship that seriously assessed the effects that popular election had on electoral dynamics 
and Senate behavior.  This literature has found only a few significant direct effects of the 17th 
Amendment on subsequent national politics: after direct elections were instituted, the partisan 
composition of the Senate shifted after 1913 towards the Democratic Party and away from long a 
period of Republican dominance, and senators typically had slightly longer tenures in office 
(Haynes 1938; Stewart 1992a, 1992b; King and Ellis 1996; Hibbing and Brandes Crook 1997; 
Wirls 1998).    
This paper takes a different tack from this existing body of work, by exploring electoral 
dynamics in the state legislatures prior to the implementation of direct popular elections in 1914.  
Specifically, we examine state legislative elections of senators during the period from 1870 to 
1913.  So far as we can tell, no prior research has done this systematically, even though ad hoc 
accounts of particularly exciting (and therefore probably unusual) Senate elections have found 
their way into print. 
In particular, we ask two questions in this paper:  First, how conflictual were state 
legislative elections for U.S. Senate, and how did that conflict vary across time and geography?  
Second, were the parties able to cohere in support of a single candidate at the outset of the 
election; and if so, did party coherence around candidates increase or decrease over time? 
                                                 
1 Haynes (1906) is the classic analysis of Senate elections before popular vote.  See pp.153-226 for a discussion of 
the laundry list of reasons cited for favoring Senate election reform. 
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Conventional wisdom about Senate elections at this time is that they were 
already essentially popular and controlled by party machines at the state level.  The canvas, 
which linked state legislators with specific candidates for U.S. Senate prior to state legislature 
elections, served as a direct link between voters and U.S. senators (Riker 1955).  That suggests 
that when state legislators met after the state election, conflict and uncertainty would be minimal, 
presumably because the majority party would have settled on their Senate choice as part of their 
platform when running candidates for the statehouse.   
The answers we discover cast doubt on this common characterization of Senate elections. 
First, conflict, measured by the prevalence of multi-ballot and multi-candidate Senate elections, 
was common before 1900, and much less likely from 1901 onward.  Second, the influence of 
partisanship grew over this time.  Ironically, Senate elections after the widespread adoption of 
Progressive electoral reforms in the 1890s showed even greater partisan structuring than in the 
period when party machines were supposedly dominant and monolithic. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section I details the incidence of 
conflict and competition that arose in state legislatures when choosing their U.S. Senators as 
measured by deadlocked elections, joint session ballots, and the effective number of candidates 
who vied for a Senate seat.  Section II applies theories of coalition size and legislative behavior 
to explain the levels of conflict within and between parties in deciding Senate elections.  Section 
III contains a preliminary discussion of the effects of post-1896 partisan shifts and subsequent 
Progressive electoral reforms on coalitions sizes and conflict in state legislatures.  Section IV 
concludes the paper and discusses other elements of Senate elections that are not tested with our 
current data but which we plan to analyze in future work.  
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I.  Levels of Conflict in Senate Elections – Dreaded Deadlocks and Joint 
Sessions  
For the period covered by this paper, Senate election procedures were covered by an 
1866 law that was passed in response to controversies that arose in Senate elections prior to the 
Civil War.2  The framework enunciated in the 1866 act provided for a two-step process.  As was 
typical before 1866, each chamber was to meet separately at noon on the second Tuesday after 
the state legislature had organized, to vote separately for senator.  On the following day at noon, 
the two chambers would meet in joint session to canvass the votes.  If a majority of members of 
each chamber favored the same candidate, he would be declared elected.  If not, then the “joint 
convention” of legislators from both chambers would ballot, a majority being required for 
election.  If no majority resulted, the joint convention was required to ballot at least once a day 
until a senator was chosen.  
When the Act of 1866 was being considered, some U.S. senators favored writing the law 
such that deadlocked state legislatures could conduct no other business except balloting for 
senator until a winner was selected.  The senators argued that because the 1866 law was 
specifically intended to preclude a legislature from adjourning sine die without choosing a U.S. 
Senator, it was reasonable to include this provision. Their efforts failed, and deadlocks in state 
legislatures continued even after the enactment of the 1866 law. Adjourning a state legislature’s 
annual session without electing a U.S. senator is the most extreme indicator of electoral conflict, 
since it indicates that a majority of the state legislature regarded the election of no senator to be 
preferable to electing a compromise candidate. This New York Times description of a California 
Senate election is indicative of the kind of factionalism that frequently produced deadlock: 
                                                 
2See Haynes 1906, chapter 2,  for the background on why the law was adopted.  The law may be found at U.S. 
Statutes at Large, vol. 14, pp. 243-44. 
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California is hopelessly broken up and promises to adjourn with a dead-lock 
preventing an election, so tenacious are the partisans of different candidates and 
so reluctant are they to unite upon a man not yet named as a candidate.3 
 
If we define a Senate election deadlock as the failure to choose a senator by the time the 
state legislature adjourns sine die, there were thirteen absolute deadlocks between 1871 and 
1913.  Table 1 reports these cases of Senate election deadlock.4  Ten of the 48 states that had 
been admitted by 1912 are implicated, although Delaware stands out as the only state with 
multiple deadlocks.  All but one of the deadlocks occurred in the 1890s, which was a time 
generally characterized by electoral upheaval in many regions of the country.  Part of this 
upheaval was associated with ascendant minor parties and the fragmentation of the major parties.  
Below we will explore which of these factors—ascendant minor parties or fragmented major 
parties—were primarily responsible for the chronic Senate election deadlock during this decade. 
Outright deadlock is a crude indicator of conflict over Senate elections.  A more sensitive 
indicator of electoral conflict in Senate elections is the number of times state legislatures had to 
convene in a joint session to elect a senator.  Joint sessions were necessary if one or both 
chambers failed to elect a senator with a majority of votes, or if the two chambers produced 
different majority vote winners.  We would not consider these elections truly deadlocked, instead 
we label them protracted elections.  Figure 1 graphs the percent of all Senate general elections 
                                                 
3 Staff. “Standing of the Senate,” New York Times, March 15,  1899, p.3. 
4The deadlocks in Table 1 correspond with the instances of “no election” reported by Haynes (1906, pp. 38-39).  
Since the base of Haynes’s knowledge of deadlocks is the Tribune Almanac, which was also our starting point for 
identifying deadlocks, this correspondence is to be expected.  However, our work in gathering data directly from 
state legislative journals from a sample of 11 states has alerted us to discrepancies between the Tribune Almanac 
accounts and the official record.  Therefore, as we proceed in this project, we may find deviations from Haynes’s 
account. 
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that were resolved in joint convention from 1871 to 1913.5  Overall, 31% of the 510 
Senate general elections we have data about went to a joint convention.6  Notably, there is a 
temporal demarcation in the number of joint session Senate contests; before 1901 38% of Senate 
elections were resolved in joint convention; afterwards, the rate fell to 17%. 
[Figure 1] 
To illustrate geographic patterns in the levels of conflict in Senate elections, Table 2 
reports the fraction of Senate elections that went to joint convention, by state.  There are regional 
patterns to these data, albeit weak ones.  For instance, states west of the Mississippi had more 
joint convention elections than states to the east—31% vs. 23%.  States of the former 
Confederacy went to joint convention less frequently (19%) than northern and western states 
(28%).  Yet significant exceptions abound.  For instance, the former Confederate state South 
Carolina sent 40% of its Senate general elections to joint ballot while western Iowa never did. 
[Table 1] 
A second measure of Senate election conflict can be developed from the number of 
Senate candidates receiving votes in each election. To construct this measure, we had to gather 
data directly from state legislative journals, which are not easily accessible.  We intend to build 
this data set for all Senate elections held in this period, but we have begun by randomly sampling 
eleven states.  These eleven states were Alabama, California, Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, 
Massachusetts, Maine, Minnesota, North Carolina, and New York.  Because we wanted to ensure 
                                                 
5The data set used here is mostly from annual additions of the Tribune Almanac, supplemented by our own 
independent research.  Details about this data set are given in the appendix.  Note that throughout this paper, we 
confine our analysis to regular (general) elections to the Senate, ignoring special elections. 
6We have omitted about 73 regular Senate elections during this period because the Tribune Almanac did not provide 
sufficiently detailed or reliable information about these races.  As our research uncovers direct information about 
Senate elections, we are correcting the Tribune Almanac accounts. 
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a range of states along the partisan divide, we chose the eleven states randomly, after 
stratifying them according to their support for the Republican presidential candidate in 1900.7  
(See the appendix for more details on the data set.) 
The measure we developed is called the Effective Number of Candidates, which is a 
modification of the Effective Number of Parties measure—the inverse of the Herfindahl 
fragmentation index—that has often been used in comparative political parties research (Laakso 
and Taagepera 1979).  This measure allows us to take into account all the information about 
candidates who received votes for Senate without over-weighting candidates who received just a 
single vote.   
The measure, Effective Number of Candidates (ENC) can be defined as follows: 
ENC fs t
i
C
c s t
s t
, , ,
,
= 

=
−
∑ 2
1
1
 
where fc,s,t = the fraction of votes received by candidate c in state s in year t and Cs,t = the number 
of candidates receiving votes in a legislature in state s in year t.   
Of course, whether the ENC is “large” or “small” in any particular election can only be 
judged in reference to how closely the parties in the legislature are balanced and the degree to 
which there are third (and fourth) parties in the legislature.  If the number of candidates equals 
the number of parties, it can be said that Senate elections were driven by inter-party competition. 
If the number of candidates exceeds the number of parties, then we might conjecture that intra-
party factionalism had a larger role in producing multi-candidate Senate elections.   So, to 
develop a reasonable comparison, we needed to compute the effective number of parties in each 
                                                 
7In truth, we chose ten states randomly.  The eleventh state, Massachusetts, was chosen because it was a convenient 
place to start in understanding the state data sources needed for the larger project. 
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state legislative chamber for each year in which a state in our sample held a Senate 
election.  The measure, ENP, can be defined as follows: 
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where fp,s,t = the fraction of seats held by party p in state s in year t and Ps,t = the number of 
parties represented in a legislature in state s in year t.   
Figure 2 graphs the effective number of Senate candidates and parties in each state House 
of Representatives in our sample from 1871 to 1913; Figure 3 does the same for the state 
Senates.  Examination of these graphs reveals a rich variation in Senate election controversy 
during this period.8  The first pattern we note is the variation across states in the correlation 
between effective number of parties and effective number of candidates.  Essentially, some states 
regularly saw many more effective candidates for Senate than one would predict based on the 
number of parties in the legislatures.  California, Kansas, Kentucky, Florida, and to a lesser  
extent, Massachusetts, all had a higher number of effective candidates than we would predict; 
Iowa, Maine, New York and North Carolina generally had a one-to-one correspondence between 
parties and candidates; Minnesota had instances of being above and below the expected number 
of candidates; and Alabama was consistently below.  What is unusual about Alabama is that we 
see a neighboring southern state, Florida, clearly yielding to factionalism on a regular basis, even 
though the Democratic Party was comparably dominant in both states.  
[Figure 2 and 3] 
                                                 
8 We have also collected the data on individual voting patterns among state legislators but have not 
analyzed it yet, so for the moment the inferences we can draw about individual behavior are necessarily ecological 
and therefore subject to revision. 
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A second general observation about the graphs in Figures 2 and 3 concerns 
conflict before and after 1900.  With the exception of North Carolina in 1903 and California in 
1905, the major multi-candidate elections are confined to the period before 1900.  Indeed, in 
about half the states (Florida, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, and Minnesota), multi-
candidate elections were regular occurrences before the 1890, but became rare after 1900.   
The pattern of single and two-candidate elections reflects an inverse trend to the pattern 
of multi-candidate elections over time.  Table 3 reports the percentage of elections, in each state 
and each legislative chamber, in which precisely one or precisely two candidates received votes.  
One-candidate elections are most likely associated with a single-party legislature united behind a 
single candidate, or alternatively a two-party legislature in which the minority party has chosen 
to absent itself from the senatorial elections, probably because of futility.  A two-candidate 
election may be associated with a fractured single dominant party, but most likely is associated 
with two parties, each united behind a single candidate. 
[Table 3] 
Table 3 suggests a pattern that is consistent with those shown in Figures 2 and 3.  First, 
the number of one- and two-candidate elections increased significantly after 1900.  Before 1900, 
such tightly contested affairs were unusual in state lower chambers, and only slightly more 
common in upper chambers.  After 1900, one- and two-candidate elections became common 
throughout the country.  Second, one- and two-candidate races were the rule after 1900 in states 
where one party dominated; in more contested states, it appears that the major parties were rarely 
cohesive enough to confine their ballots to a single candidate each.  Third, except for New York, 
there were fewer candidates considered in state senates than in state houses of representatives. 
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Why was multi-candidate conflict common before 1890 and unusual after 
1900?   There are two applicable theories that can be applied to explain this trend.  Each centers 
on partisanship but from different vantage points: partisanship in the legislature, and partisanship 
in the electorate. The legislative partisanship explanation is derived from theories of legislative 
coalitions that predict stability as a function of their size.  The electoral partisanship explanation 
focuses on how shifts in political movements external to the legislature affected the strength and 
cohesion of parties in the legislature.    
II.  Legislative Partisanship, Coalition Size and Conflict over Senate Elections 
Political scientists have long known, theoretically and practically, that political coalitions 
are the most fragile at the extremes of coalition size, that is, when they are narrowly small or 
exceptionally large.  Narrowly small coalitions are more conducive to being undermined by the 
strategic behavior of the minority, since only a few majority coalition members need to be picked 
off in order to convert the previous minority into the new majority.  Similarly, when the coalition 
sizes of two major blocs are nearly equal, smaller “third party” blocs can also create difficulty in 
building winning coalitions, or even block the formation of winning coalitions. 
Such was the case in the 1893 North Dakota election.  The Republicans had a slim 
majority in the senate with 19 seats to 17 seats held by a combination of Democrats, 
Independents, Independent Democrats and Independent Republicans.  In the house, they had 31 
seats to 31 seats held by a similar combination of other parties. The Republicans had a two vote 
majority in the joint convention but they could not agree on a candidate, and they did not 
uniformly support their incumbent Senator (Casey).  There were 7 major candidates on the 1st 
ballot, which gradually winnowed down to 6 and then 4, and on the 61st ballot there were three 
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major candidates; a Democrat, William Roach, who won with 50 votes, Casey who 
received 23 votes, and Smith who received 1 vote, the other 18 votes were scattered across other 
candidates.9    
Conflict in legislatures can occur between parties and within parties.  A narrow partisan 
majority in one chamber is often an indicator that electoral sentiments in the state are closely 
divided; if sentiments are closely divided, then the chances increase that party control of the two 
chambers is split. This was certainly true during the period covered here: when the state house’s 
party majority margin of control was less than 5% of seats, the opposite party controlled the state 
senate in 33% of the cases.  When the majority party had a larger margin of control, the 
incidence of split-party legislatures dropped to 6%.  Similar trends appear in the cases where the 
majority party control of the state senate was razor-thin.  We expect that the condition of divided 
state government with narrow majorities should produce increased conflict over U.S. Senate 
election contests.    
At the other extreme of coalition size, outsized majorities are bountiful fodder for 
factionalism, which also intensified the conflict over Senate seats.  Theoretically, this is simply a 
re-statement of Riker’s “size principle” (Riker 1962).  Empirically, students of American politics 
are well aware of the application and consequences of this principle.10  Both of these 
observations suggest that the relationship between the ease of electing senators and the size of 
                                                 
9 Tribune Almanac, 1894, p. 90. 
10 Martin Van Buren understood the principle’s power, as he worked nearly as hard to exclude people from the 
Democratic party as to include them (Remini 1959).  And of course a major theme of V.O. Key’s Southern Politics 
(1948) was the operation of factional politics in the one-party South. 
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the largest legislative party should be curvilinear—more difficult at the extremes of 
majority party size and less difficult for intermediate ranges.   
The reelection of Wilkinson Call in Florida in 1891 is a good illustration of the effects of 
the size principle on intra-party factionalism.  The results of the 1890 election gave Democrats 
all 68 seats in the state house and 31 out of 32 seats in the state senate, There were 6 effective 
candidates on the first ballot in each chamber when voting began on April 21, 1891, and it took 
30 joint session ballots for Senator Call to win the election on May 26, 1891.  One of the 
complications was that even though Call could command at least a majority in each chamber, 
and in joint session, the internal rules of the Democratic caucus in the legislature required the 
nominee to secure two-thirds of the support of the caucus. That allowed minority wings of the 
majority party to hold sway over the final nominee.  The New York Times provided a revealing 
description of the dynamics of the intra-party conflict that surrounded the election:  
Call is particularly strong in the country districts of the State, and the sparsely 
settled and agricultural sections of the State, are, of course, in the majority as far 
as the representatives in the Legislature is concerned.  The legislative canvass in 
November last was prosecuted almost solely upon the Call and anti-Call issue.  In 
almost every instance it became necessary in order to secure the nomination to 
either branch for the candidate to declare his position on the Senatorial question, 
and in this way, as soon as the election was over, the complexion of it was pretty 
well understood.  
 
A candidate with 51 votes in joint session is sure of an election, but a Democrat in 
order to secure the party nomination, must have 66 votes and the opposition to 
Senator Call is, therefore, as a generally thing, strongly in favor of an adherence 
to the two-thirds rule, hoping in this way to shut Call out from securing the 
coveted 66 votes in caucus. 11  
 
                                                 
11Staff, “Florida’s Next Senator, Mr. Call in the Race with Many Competitors.” The New York Times, April 6, 1891, 
pg. 1 
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Even more astounding was that the governor, who opposed Call’s reelection, 
refused to certify the election and appointed someone else in his stead.  Ultimately, Call did take 
his seat in the Senate in late 1891.  In the case of Florida, even with a general canvass before the 
election and near complete partisan domination, conflict was as intense within the party as we 
would have found between two parties in a legislature with a small majority party margin of 
control.  In the section below, we discuss more general findings as to whether coalition size has 
an impact on conflict in Senate elections, and whether there is evidence that shifting coalition 
sizes contributed to the decrease in seriously contested Senate elections after 1900.  
Three rough cuts at the data confirm a curvilinear relationship between majority party 
size and conflict over Senate elections.  The first is simply the fraction of joint ballot elections 
associated with split-party control of state legislatures, compared to unified control.  Using the 
eleven-state sample as our comparison base, during this period 83% of Senate elections under 
split party control required a joint ballot, compared to 22% of elections with unified control.  
Subsequently, when these elections went to joint ballots, they were also more protracted: divided 
control joint ballots required 17 ballots on average to resolve (median=3), compared to 7 ballots 
under unified control (median=2). 
The second cut looks at the fraction of Senate elections that went to joint ballots as a 
function of partisan majorities.  The cell entries in Table 4 report the fraction of Senate elections 
that went to joint ballot as a function of the majority party sizes in the two legislative chambers. 
For the eleven states in our sample, we have characterized each legislative chamber’s partisan 
majority into three categories.  The break points are at a 25% margin and 75% margin.12 
                                                 
12 Margin is defined as the percentage of seats held by the majority party minus the percentage of seats held by the 
minority.  Close majorities are those where the majority held a 62.5%-37.5% advantage over the minority, or 
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Majorities narrower than 25% (i.e., a 62.5%-37.5% advantage to the majority) are 
deemed “close”; majorities larger than 75% (i.e., a 87.5%-12.5% advantage to the majority) are 
deemed “large.”   
The data in Table 4 provide initial confirmation of the curvilinear prediction. The cell 
entries along the main diagonal provide the strongest evidence of the effects of joint majority 
party size. The most frequent case of joint ballots occurred when the majority in both chambers 
was narrow, the next-most-frequent was when the majorities were large in both chambers, and 
the least frequent was when they were intermediate in both chambers.  In both the House and the 
Senate, chambers with narrow partisan majorities and chambers with very large partisan 
majorities were each more likely to produce a joint ballot than chambers with intermediate 
majorities.  
[Table 4] 
Once states went into joint balloting for Senate elections, the effect of the size principle 
on the intensity of conflict changed slightly.  The data in Table 5 provide evidence that the most 
heavily fought Senate elections were those held when the partisan majorities were close and 
large in the joint convention.  Using the same categories as Table 4, Table 5 presents the mean 
and median number of ballots needed to resolve protracted elections.  Once a state legislature 
had to proceed to joint balloting, majority parties with larger margins of control actually had a 
harder time reaching agreement than majority parties with narrow majorities—and both sizes of 
                                                                                                                                                             
narrower.  Large majorities are those in which the majority held a 87.5%-12.5% advantage over the minority, or 
greater.  
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majorities had a harder time reaching a decision than when the majority size was more 
moderate.13 
Kentucky provides instructive examples of how protracted elections took different paths, 
depending on the narrowness of the party majorities.  The first case was the election of 1876, 
when James Burnie Beck (Dem.) was elected, replacing John W. Stevenson (Dem.).  The state 
election of 1875 had returned a heavily Democratic legislature, standing at 32-6 in the Senate, 
89-11 in the House, making the joint session party margin 121-17.   
When the legislature convened in Frankfort, five Democrats were actively in the running:  
Sen. Stevenson; Beck (a member of the U.S. House); Isaac Caldwell, John Stuart Williams 
(former Kentucky state representative and gubernatorial candidate, later U.S. senator), and 
Preston H. Leslie (the governor) (LCJ 1/4/1876, p. 1).14  The Republicans, holding out the 
possibility that they might be able to capture the seat if the Democrats cannibalized themselves,    
agreed to combine their efforts around a single candidate, initially William Cassius Goodloe, a 
state senator from Lexington.  
In the week preceding the ballot, legislators were “singularly uncommittal” about whom 
they were supporting (LCJ 1/8/1876, p. 3).  The newspaper correspondent for the Louisville 
Courier-Journal who reported on the proceedings was willing to characterize the personalities of 
                                                 
13 Another issue we intend to pursue here is the ability of the House, as the more numerous body, to prevail in a joint 
convention.  Although conventional wisdom is aligned with this prediction, along with some claims in the literature, 
our preliminary analysis casts doubt on this claim.  First our analysis here suggests that large House majorities did 
not reduce the number of joint ballots.  Second, we also find that whenever different parties controlled state 
legislative chambers, the majority that controlled the House was no more likely to control the outcome of the joint 
convention than the majority that controlled the Senate.  Indeed, the House majority controlled the outcome of the 
joint convention only 29% of the time.  In order to make this argument, we need to analyze the relationship between 
the winning candidates in separate chamber votes, compared to the winning candidate in joint ballots.  This is 
analysis that awaits us in the future. 
14 The following account was taken from articles in the Louisville Courier-Journal, abbreviated LCJ in the text. 
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the candidates and their supporters as they canvassed for votes, but wrote virtually 
nothing about the political forces aligned behind the various candidates.  The only evidence of 
substantive divisions was a note that Grange elements held a majority in the Democratic caucus, 
and that these members could elect Williams if they wished.  The New York Times account of 
Caldwell’s withdrawal before the balloting began suggested that his supporters would probably 
go over to Stevenson (NYT 1/10/1876, p. 1). 
Although the Republicans caucused before balloting began, the Democrats did not, so on 
the day of separate balloting in the two chambers (January 12, 1876), five men received votes:  
Williams led in the House (25 of 98 votes) and Beck led in the Senate (15 of 37 votes).  When 
the joint ballot was held the next day, positions within the two chambers held, placing Beck (40 
votes) and Williams (35) neck-and-neck, with Leslie (27), Stevenson (19), and Goodloe (15) 
trailing behind. 
Five ballots were held over the next two days, and yet no caucus of the Democrats was 
called to resolve the battle.  The explanation put forward by the Courier-Journal correspondent 
is intriguing:  Apparently the caucus rule provided that in balloting for nominations within the 
caucus, the bottom vote-getter was dropped in each succeeding round, until the race was reduced 
to two candidates if necessary.  Supporters of Beck (for instance) were reluctant to call a caucus 
because supporters of Stevenson (for instance) would recognize this as a move to knock 
Stevenson out of the race, thus causing Stevenson’s supporters to jump to Williams.  Supporters 
of second-tier candidates regarded the caucus as certain death for their candidates; supporters of 
first-tier candidates regarded a caucus as something that would only antagonize other factions 
whose votes were needed.  Thus, balloting was allowed to continue without a Democratic caucus 
for several days.  (LCJ 1/14/1876, p. 1). 
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On the third day of the joint ballot, Stevenson dropped out.  This left support 
for the remaining candidates as follows:  Beck 47, Williams 45, Leslie 28, and Wadsworth 
(Rep.) 14.15  Sixty-eight votes were needed for election.  That night, a Democratic caucus was 
finally called, whereupon “filibustering commenced at the outset” (LCJ 1/15/1876, p. 1).  Tied in 
parliamentary knots, the caucus adjourned for the weekend. 
With the withdrawal of Stevenson, the Democratic caucus was in a bind.  It was clear by 
this time that Leslie’s support was coming from legislators who were simply trying to ingratiate 
themselves with the governor, but that Leslie was never going to garner enough support from 
either the Williams or Beck factions to win.  The immediate problem was that Leslie’s support 
was not unified behind a second choice.  Thus, there was a real possibility that if Leslie simply 
withdrew, his support might redistribute to Beck and Williams haphazardly, putting the 
Republicans in a position to choose the senator. 
Upon reconvening after the weekend, the joint convention picked up where it had left off.  
However, after two more ballots, Governor Leslie withdrew, the joint session was immediately 
adjourned, and the Democratic caucus got to work.  After battling for five straight hours through 
parliamentary obstacles, the caucus finally voted to endorse Beck, adjourning at 2am.  The next 
morning Beck was elected with 106 votes to the Republican Wadsworth’s 14.16 
For a protracted Senate election, this may seem like a complicated affair, and it was.  But, 
it is important to note that at no time in the proceedings was there ever any doubt that a 
Democrat would eventually be elected.  And, there was never any indication that supporters of 
                                                 
15The Republican practice during the balloting was to shift support to a different single Republican each day.   
16In Haynes’s (1906, pp. 88–92) terms, this was a “stampeded election,” that is, a protracted election that, from the 
perspective of the Journal, was transformed instantly from a multi-candidate fracas to a majority party cake walk. 
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second-tier candidates would prefer for the Senate seat to go unfilled rather than accept 
a less-favored first-tier Democrat.  The problem was that the balloting involved a host of up-and-
coming stars of Kentucky politics, and no one wanted to needlessly insult a range of candidates, 
all of whom might one day rise further. Once the balloting became tricky, with two equally-
balanced Democrats, the protracted balloting simply became a method to allow the Democrats to 
get all their ducks in a row—to make sure the Leslie faction would all shift in the same direction. 
This is significantly different from the balloting in Kentucky that occurred twenty years 
later, in January 1896.  Unlike 1876, both chambers of the Kentucky legislature were closely 
divided in 1896.  The election of 1895 had been disastrous for Kentucky Democrats, as 
Kentucky voters rejected growing free silver sentiment within the Democratic Party; Democrats 
lost the governorship for the first time since the Civil War.  Republicans controlled the state 
house for the first time ever, with a six-seat majority (46-52).  Democrats were able to hold onto 
a small majority in the senate (22-16) only because half the senate was not up for election in 
1895.  The result was a 68-68 tie in the joint convention. 
Compared to 1876, when it took seven calendar days to resolve the Senate election, the 
1896 Kentucky legislature balloted 51 times for nearly two full months and then adjourned sine 
die without choosing a senator.  The governor then called the legislature into special session the 
next year, which produced a two-month-long session that took 60 ballots to finally elect W.J. 
Deboe (Rep.) to the Senate.  Therefore, it might seem that telling the story of the 1896 election is 
even more complicated.  It certainly was more harrowing. 
Sen. Joseph C.S. Blackburn, who had previously been elected to the Senate in 1890, 
stood again for reelection in 1896.  However, with the anti-silver sentiment that swept the state in 
the 1895 election, Blackburn’s chances looked slim.  Not only was there a virtual tie in the joint 
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convention, but a small number of “sound money Democrats” refused to support 
Blackburn’s nomination.17  Yet all was not lost.  The Republicans themselves had enough 
Populist elements that their ranks were not perfectly unified.  And, the Democrats also seemed to 
have a slight edge in vacancies owing to illness.  It might be possible for Blackburn and his 
forces to simply wait out the Republicans, and then sweep in at the right moment and claim 
victory. 
Such was not to be the case, however.  In the initial balloting, Blackburn was put up 
against W. Godfrey Hunter, who at the time was a two-term member of the U.S. House.  For the 
first six weeks of balloting, Blackburn and Hunter’s combined voted account for at least 90% of 
the ballots cast.  Both parties held fault lines, and party leaders tried to find formulas that would 
bring the reluctant onboard.  The most visible of these efforts occurred on the Democratic side, 
as leaders appealed to the most prominent Kentuckian in national politics, Treasury Secretary 
John Carlisle (himself a former U.S. Senator from Kentucky), to use his influence to bring six 
recalcitrant sound money Democrats back on board.  Carlisle refused, making deadlock the best 
result for the Democrats (NYT 2/17/1896, p. 1; 2/20/1896, p. 4). 
As the deadlock continued, attention turned to the possibility that the election could be 
decided by unseating members of the two chambers.  The Republican majority in the House 
unseated a Democratic House member, and the Democratic majority in the Senate unseated a 
Republican senator.  This, in turn, led to the first report of seriously threatened violence, as 
partisans rushed to block entrances to the legislative chambers, and pistols were drawn.  “Crowds 
of angry and excited men surrounded the halls of both branches, and bloodshed was several 
                                                 
17 Blackburn was endorsed by the joint Democratic caucus with 37 votes, to 13 for J.B. McCreary and 6 for John Y. 
Brown.  NYT , 1/11/1896, p. 2. 
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times threatened. (NYT 3/12/1896, p. 1).  It was apparent at this point that if a majority 
of votes were to settle the senatorial contest, it would be resolved in favor of the Republicans, 
whereupon mobs of Blackburn supporters swarmed into Frankfort, intent upon ensuring that the 
legislature did not act.  The Frankfort correspondent of the Louisville Courier-Journal described 
the situation this way: 
There was not a score out of the 132 members at Saturday’s session who did not 
have one or two pistols concealed, to say nothing of knives and other weapons . . . 
James Walton, whose presence was obnoxious to the Democrats, was placed 
among Republican associates, and one of the most fearless of the party, well 
armed, was deputed to open fire on any one who attempted to molest them.  The 
Democrats had several trustworthy men in a position to cover this Republican in 
case of a signal for close action.  (quoted in Haynes 1906, p. 50) 
 
Finally, the Republican governor called out the state militia, which occupied the hall of 
the House of Representatives.  The following was the New York Times account of the closing of 
the session: 
The ballot began.  Not a man, Republican or Democrat, answered to his 
name during the call of the Senate roll.  Mr. Burnham asked for a call of the 
Senate absentees, but got no second.  There were no votes in the House until 
Burnham’s name was called, and he voted for Boyle.  Garrett also voted for 
Boyle.  No other persons answered, and the ballot resulted:  Boyle, 2. 
Mr. Howard moved that the session be dissolved “everlastingly, eternally, 
and forever.” 
His motion was carried with a wild yell.  A member started up the 
Doxology, and the crowd in the lobby joined in. 
Senator Blackburn sat in the Senate cloakroom, and he and his friends 
professed satisfaction at having prevented the election of a Republican Senator. . . 
The silver Democrats, whose candidate he was, certainly are chagrined, 
while the sound-money Democrats are contended at the thought that they have 
prevented the election of a free-coinage Senator.  (NYT 3/18/1896, p. 2) 
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Kentucky was not the only state deadlocked following the state legislative 
sessions of 1896 and 1897,18 and the U.S. Senate itself was nearly equally divided between 
Republicans and a combination of Democrats and a host of other anti-Republican minor parties.  
Therefore, the Kentucky governor called the legislature back into special session, with the nation 
watching.  Intervening between the regular session and the special session was the resignation or 
death of seven members and special elections to fill these vacancies, which had netted the 
Republicans two more seats in joint session (NYT 3/12/1897, p. 3).  Consequently, it was 
assumed that a Republican would prevail this time.   
Blackburn refused to go down without a fight, and his supporters tried at every turn to 
filibuster a choice.  The Republicans themselves were not perfectly unified either.  The 
Republican governor had fallen out with Mark Hanna over whether to attempt an interim 
appointment to fill the resulting vacancy and over who the ideal candidate would be as a 
permanent replacement.  Hanna finally prevailed in his choice of W. Godfrey Hunter, but enough 
supporters of Gov. Bradley were sufficiently insulted that they refused to rally behind Hunter. 
Blackburn’s parliamentary skills and Hunter’s failure to unite the Republicans were no 
match for the true surprise this time around.  After a month of balloting, a grand jury indicted 
Hunter and a host of other officials for bribery in connection with attempting to secure votes for 
Hunter’s election (NYT 4/18/1897, p. 1).  Although this move was greeted by Republican leaders 
as being motivated by partisanship, it also revealed a rift within the Republican ranks.  The 
administration had lost confidence in Hunter and Hanna’s lieutenant in Frankfort, Samuel Taylor 
of Ohio, asked Hunter to step aside.  Hunter refused at the time, but as balloting continued on, 
                                                 
18 Idaho and Oregon were also in doubt. 
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Hunter finally withdrew.  The Republicans rallied behind state senator William Deboe 
who, despite being knifed soon after he received the caucus nomination, was finally elected on 
the 112th ballot. 
As the two cases of Kentucky suggest, protracted Senate elections generally took one of 
two paths, depending on whether the conflict was fundamentally intra-party or inter-party.  In 
intra-party conflict, a desire to keep the minority party from playing a pivotal role in choosing a 
senator kept the party factions working to find an intra-party solution.  In inter-party conflict, 
two dynamics came into play.  First, political and personal sensibilities were often tender enough 
that neither party could assume it could get precisely all of its adherents to rally behind its 
official candidate.  With elections requiring a majority of a quorum, only one or two holdouts 
could keep the balloting going.  Second, a party that suffered from being the (slight) minority 
could take advantage of minority rifts through a number of tactics, including disappearing 
quorums, to string out the balloting. 
III. The Impact of Realignment and Progressive Reforms 
The striking pattern of Senate elections in state legislatures is the degree to which conflict 
was reduced and regularized after 1900.  Why?  The two most obvious sources of explanation 
are the “realignment of 1896” and the effects of Progressive election reforms; either or both of 
these phenomena might explain the decline of conflict in Senate elections after 1900.  In the 
section below, we offer a very preliminary discussion of the adequacy of these explanations as 
applied to our data.    
It is well established that the partisan distribution of the electorate shifted significantly 
during the series of state and national elections spanning 1894 to 1898, although the causes and 
consequences of the shift is controversial  (Key 1955, 1959; Schattschneider 1960; Burnham 
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1965, 1967; Sundquist 1983; Brady 1988; Mayhew 2002).  Prior to this period, the 
partisan division of many states was close.  After this period, many states were effectively 
controlled by one party or the other. 
A shift of a large bloc of states from the competitive range before 1896 to the 
uncompetitive range afterwards would have obvious implications for our predictions about 
competition in Senate elections, but these predictions are not simple.  On the one hand, a shift of 
states from the highly competitive range to the moderately competitive would reduce the number 
of protracted Senate races caused by things like divided party control of state legislatures or third 
party mischief.  On the other hand, a shift of states from moderately competitive to 
uncompetitive (i.e., effectively one-party) would increase the opportunities for protracted Senate 
races caused by intra-party factionalism. 
In general, the net migration of states across party competition categories during the so-
called 1896 realignment added many more states into the effective one-party category.  To 
illustrate the shifting sizes of majority party coalitions in state legislatures, we constructed a 
measure of partisan “closeness” in state legislatures that is defined as: 
Closenesss,t = abs(Dem. pct. of joint conventions,t – Rep. pct. of joint conventions,t) 
for state s in state election year t.  Then, we averaged across all legislative sessions for two 
periods:  1871-1900 and 1901-1913.  Figure 4 shows the graph of post-1900 closeness against 
pre-1900 closeness.  All observations above the diagonal line are states whose legislative 
majorities became less close across the two periods. Consistent with the conventional wisdom of 
the period, most states (34 of 48 states) lie above the diagonal line.  
The windowpane pattern on the graph is created by drawing horizontal and vertical lines 
to correspond (for each period) with states that on average had close, intermediate, and large 
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partisan majorities in their state legislatures.  Note first that two of the three states that 
had a close partisan legislative majority before 1900 shifted into the intermediate category 
afterwards.  Both of these states, Indiana and New York, had a decline in joint ballot activity, 
whereas Illinois did not, just as we would predict.  Second, note that three states, Montana, 
Missouri, and Delaware, moved from the intermediate party majority category to the close party 
majority category.  Of these three states, Montana and Delaware entered into a new period of 
contested Senate elections.  Therefore, among the states that switched between competitive and 
intermediate partisan environments, we generally find that the pattern of U.S. Senate election 
competition is consistent with the theoretical prediction that narrow partisan majorities lead to 
contentious Senate elections. 
At the same time, Riker’s size principle would lead us to expect the six states in the upper 
middle of Figure 4 to experience more intra-party factionalism and thus more joint conventions.  
But instead, all of these states (Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Michigan, North Dakota, and South 
Dakota) experienced a dramatic drop-off in the number of joint ballots after 1900. 
The fact that intra-party factionalism appears to have pretty much vanished after 1900 
despite an increase in the size of majority coalitions in many states, requires us to go beyond 
theories of legislative coalitions to explain the shifting pattern of Senate election conflict during 
this period.  The logical place to turn here is to the rise of Progressive reforms and the evolution 
of electoral institutions.  The Progressive reforms at the turn of the century, including the 
Australian ballot and the direct primary, have been widely studied for their effects on both 
electoral dynamics and congressional behavior (Rusk 1970; Galderisi and Ginsberg 1986; Katz 
and Sala 1996).  Furthermore, a special variant directed at Senate elections, the inadequate 
“Oregon plan” de facto popular election, has also been studied.  However, as far as we know, no 
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research has examined the effects of these reforms on state legislatures, and 
particularly on state legislative elections to the U.S. Senate.    
Scholars have tended to regard the Progressive reforms as undermining the power of the 
party machines.  Although we only have limited evidence here, our initial findings suggest that 
the onset of these reforms is generally associated with a reduction in party factionalism, and thus 
a strengthening of party organizations in electing U.S. senators.  This is just a hypothesis at this 
point.  Our next paper, which examines the voting records of individual state legislators, will 
confirm or deny our suspicion that party regularity in U.S. Senate elections increased after 1900. 
Additionally, scholars have also regarded the “Oregon Plan” a failure, since it did not 
lead automatically to the popular vote winner securing election by the legislature. The “Oregon 
Plan” was extreme in sending the actual election to the voters.  It was more common to send the 
nomination of party candidates to voters.  By 1910, popular primaries to nominate party 
candidates for the U.S. Senate were common.19  Even if the Oregon Plan was a failure, popular 
nominations may have succeeded in increasing the predictability of Senate elections in state 
legislatures because a majority party nominee was chosen prior to the start of legislative 
balloting.   
Our very preliminary look at this issue suggests that the direct primary may have indeed 
reduced the number of candidates receiving votes in the legislative balloting, or at least reduced 
the “ground clutter.”  Here we use data gathered by Andrea Campbell about whether senators 
                                                 
19 Kernell and Engstrom (2003, Table 3) provide a summary of years when non-southern states instituted party 
primaries for Senate elections.  To round out their table, the following are the years when we have discovered, 
through the Tribune Almanac and other sources, when southern states first instituted primaries to nominate Senate 
candidates:  Alabama (1907), Arkansas (1907), Florida (1905), Georgia (1909), Louisiana (1904), Mississippi 
(1904), North Carolina (1909), South Carolina (1885), Tennessee (1901), Texas (1907), and Virginia (1906).  
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received the endorsement of state conventions or direct primaries.20  Table 6 reports a 
series of regression and probit analyses, for each chamber, that predict (1) the effective number 
of candidates receiving votes, (2) whether precisely one candidate received votes, and (3) 
whether precisely two candidates received votes.21 
[Table 6] 
 For both chambers, direct primary endorsement predicts one less candidate receiving 
votes, though the effect is imprecisely estimated in the senates.  Party convention endorsement 
did not reduce factionalism, however.  (Although the corresponding coefficient is negative for 
both chambers, the standard errors in both cases are larger than the coefficients.)  Party 
convention endorsements perfectly predict more than one candidate receiving votes in both 
chambers, no doubt because party conventions tended to be held in northern, multi-party states 
and not in the south.   
Similarly, direct primary endorsement is positively correlated with precisely one 
candidate receiving votes in the two sets of chambers, no doubt due to the appearance of the 
primary in the one-party south.  Indeed, if we re-run the analysis in Table 6 separately for the 
southern and non-southern states, the primary only has an effect in producing one-candidate 
contests in the south, not in the north and west. 
                                                 
20 The data consist of codings, based on a variety of documentary sources, in cases where there is evidence a 
winning Senate candidate received a party endorsement, in the period before popular election.  The data set does not 
include information about losing candidates. 
21 Among the 11 states and 166 general elections in our sample, 7 involved the winner being endorsed by a party 
convention; 21 were cases where the winner had been endorsed in a primary.  The party conventions are evenly split 
around the 1900 divide (3 before and 4 afterwards) whereas almost all the primaries are after 1900 (19 of 21).  
Along the north/south divide (counting Florida and Alabama, but not Kentucky, in the south), all the party 
conventions were from the north, as were most of the primaries (12 of 21).  On a proportional basis, primaries 
predominated in the south:  after 1900, 30% of the northern and western general elections were preceded by primary 
endorsement of the eventual winner, compared to 78% of the southern cases. 
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Finally, none of the variables reliably predicts the appearance of precisely two 
U.S. Senate candidates in the state legislatures.  This is probably a measurement issue, since we 
only have information about whether a primary or convention was held for the winning 
candidate.  To predict the behavior of two parties in a state, we would need information about the 
nominating practices of the two parties. 
Therefore, even though primaries operated outside the prescriptions of law, there is some 
evidence that they may have played a role in reducing partisan conflict in Senate elections.  As 
with ballot reform, accurately gauging the effect of mechanisms like primaries and conventions 
on regularizing Senate elections will be a topic examined in our next paper. 
IV: Conclusion and Implications    
The conventional historical story about Senate elections in state legislatures prior to the 
adoption of the 17th amendment was that they were more or less popular in nature because of the 
practice of the canvass.  Candidates for the state legislature announced their support for a party 
candidate for Senate prior to their election to the statehouse, and if a candidate got a majority of 
pledged votes in the election, he was expected to win his seat easily.  
The facts are quite different.  Senate elections prior to 1913, and especially between 1870 
and 1900, were fraught with intense and extended conflict in state legislatures.   It was not 
always the case that a single candidate received a majority of pledged votes prior to the start of 
the legislature’s session.  Frequently there were multiple candidates from the majority party who 
vied for a Senate seat.  Additionally, different majority party candidates could attract majority 
support in the state house and state senate, forcing the legislature to meet in joint session to 
resolve the contest.   Even in joint session, coalitions would form and shift their support to 
different candidates the longer the ballot process continued.  
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In this paper we identify some general trends in state legislative behavior when 
electing senators.  First, there is a distinct change in the trend in conflict in state legislatures that 
begins in 1900; prior to that date states had highly conflictual contests for electing U.S. senators 
but after that, the conflict seems to diminish.  Using a newly collected data set from state 
legislative journals, we measure conflict in three ways: the effective number of candidates who 
received votes in the legislature, the tendency for the state legislature to meet in joint session to 
resolve the election, and the number of joint session ballots the legislature had to take to elect a 
senator.    We found evidence that the effective number of candidates exceeded the effective 
number of parties in the legislature in half our cases.  Most states had to resort to joint balloting 
for at least 10 percent of their elections, and more than half of states had to use joint balloting in 
30 percent or more of their Senate elections.  When states did go to joint balloting, it took an 
average of 10 ballots to elect a senator. 
There are two possible explanations for these trends centering on legislative coalition size 
and partisanship in the electorate.  We find more support for the effect of coalition size on 
electoral conflict:  majority parties had narrow margins or oversized margins of control, conflict 
ensued.  For states with more even partisan balance in the legislature, it appears the majority 
party stayed more cohesive and cooperative in electing their U.S. Senators. 
In this paper, we do not explore the individual voting behavior in state legislatures, how 
loyal members were to their party and their pledged vote in the canvas, and how members might 
have shifted their support as the contest became more extended.  We have not yet looked at the 
role of party leaders in the legislature and their role, if any, in shaping the outcome of the 
contest.   We also have not yet looked at legislative party caucuses and relationship between a 
caucus nomination and the size of the party majority.   Lastly, a more challenging task would be 
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to gauge to what extent the elections for the legislature itself during this period of 
history were in fact contests about the election of the next U.S. Senator.   All this and more is 
still to come. 
Appendix:  Sample of State Legislative Elections of U.S. Senators 
The new data gathered specifically for this paper was based on a sample of eleven states.  
When we began this research, we suspected that a strong determinant of whether Senate 
elections in the state legislatures was contentious would be partisanship, in particular, how 
closely balanced the political parties were in each state.  We therefore decided to stratify by 
partisanship.  Ten of the states were drawn randomly, after rank-ordering them according to how 
competitive they were in the 1900 presidential election.  We added an eleventh, Massachusetts, 
because of convenience.  Those eleven states in our sample were Alabama, California, Florida, 
Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Maine, Minnesota, North Carolina, and New York. 
The data we emphasize in this paper were taken from the state legislative journals of 
these eleven states.  We have photocopied all ballots for Senate, with only a few holes caused by 
missing journals at the depositories we consulted (Library of Congress, Massachusetts State 
Library, New York Public Library, New York State Library, and Yale University Law School.). 
In addition to the formal ballots, we gathered, or are in the midst of gathering, the 
following information about each U.S. Senate election: 
• Local and national newspaper accounts of the elections. 
• State legislative members, including political parties and constitutional officers. 
• Election returns of state legislators
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Figure 1.  Percentage of Senate general elections requiring joint ballot, 1871–1913. 
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Figure 2.  Effective number of Senate candidates in state House of Representatives, 1871-1913. 
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Figure 3.  Effective number of Senate candidates in state senates, 1871-1913. 
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Figure 4.  State legislative closeness, before and after 1900. 
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Table 1.  Deadlocked Senate elections, 1871–1913. 
 
State Year 
Louisiana 1892 
Montana  1893 
Washington  1893 
Wyoming  1893 
Delaware 1895 
Kentucky 1896 
Oregon  1897 
California 1899 
Delaware 1899a
Pennsylvania 1899 
Utah  1899 
Delaware 1901 
Delaware 1905 
 
a2 seats. 
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Table 2.  States ranked according to the number of Senate general elections resolved 
by joint convention, 1871-1913. 
 
State Pct. 
Number 
of 
elections State Pct. 
Number 
of 
elections 
New Mexico 100 2 Arkansas 30 10 
Montana 67 6 Missouri 27 11 
Colorado 67 6 Indiana 25 8 
Washington 63 8 North Carolina 22 9 
Nebraska 58 12 New Hampshire 22 9 
Oregon 56 9 New York 21 14 
Maryland 50 10 Nevada 20 10 
Delaware 50 10 Georgia 20 10 
South Carolina 43 7 Alabama 20 15 
Idaho 43 7 Utah 20 5 
North Dakota 40 10 Tennessee 20 10 
West Virginia 40 10 Michigan 18 11 
Louisiana 40 10 Pennsylvania 18 11 
Massachusetts 40 15 Wyoming 17 6 
South Dakota 38 8 Texas 10 10 
Illinois 36 11 Ohio 10 10 
Kansas 36 11 Mississippi 8 12 
Florida 36 11 Rhode Island 8 13 
Wisconsin 36 11 Iowa 0 14 
Kentucky 36 14 Maine 0 15 
Connecticut 33 12 Oklahoma 0 3 
California 33 12 Virginia 0 3 
Minnesota 33 12 Vermont 0 10 
New Jersey 33 12   
 
Source:  Tribune Almanac; state House and Senate journals. 
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Table 3.  Percentage of elections with precisely one or two candidates receiving votes, 
before and after 1900. 
 
 
 Before 1900 After 1900 
State  Exactly 1 Exactly 2 1 or 2 Exactly 1 Exactly 2 1 or 2 
Alabama House 30 20 50 100 0 100 
 Senate 30 40 70 100 0 100 
California House 0 30 30 0 0 0 
 Senate 0 40 40 0 20 20 
Florida House 10 10 20 100 0 100 
 Senate 11 11 22 100 0 100 
Iowa House 0 36 36 0 100 100 
 Senate 0 60 60 0 100 100 
Kansas House 10 0 10 0 60 60 
 Senate 20 10 30 20 80 100 
Kentucky House 0 2 20 0 80 80 
 Senate 0 50 50 0 80 80 
Massachusetts House 0 38 38 0 20 20 
 Senate 0 50 50 0 40 40 
Maine House 0 60 60 0 80 80 
 Senate 40 40 80 0 100 100 
Minnesota House 0 10 10 20 20 40 
 Senate 10 20 30 40 20 60 
North Carolina House 0 36 36 0 67 67 
 Senate 8 50 58 0 80 80 
New York House 0 70 70 0 75 75 
 Senate 0 50 50 0 50 50 
Total House 5 30 35 22 45 67 
 Senate 11 39 50 24 52 76 
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Table 4.  Prevalence of joint ballots, given size of majority party control. 
 
 Senate majority margin 
House majority 
margin <25% 25%-75% >75% Total 
<25% 33% 
(15) 
24% 
(21) 
100% 
(1) 
30% 
(37) 
25%-75% 33% 
(3) 
17% 
(76) 
19% 
(27) 
18% 
(106) 
>75% — 80% 
(5) 
23% 
(22) 
33% 
(27) 
Total 33% 
(18) 
22% 
(102) 
22% 
(50) 
23% 
(170) 
 
Source:  11-state sample of legislative journals (Senate election data) and ICPSR study 0016 
(party control of legislatures).
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Table 5.  Average and median number of ballots needed to resolve joint ballots, 1871-
1913. 
 
Joint 
convention 
majority Mean ballots 
Median 
ballots N 
<25% 13.3 2.5 18 
25-75% 11.1 1.5 16 
>75% 16.9 2 11 
Total 13.4 2 45 
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Table 6.  Effect of party convention endorsement and direct primary on number of 
candidates receiving votes in state legislative U.S. senate elections, 1871 – 1913 (standard errors 
in parentheses). 
 
 Senate House 
 
Effective 
number of 
candidates 
Precisely 1 
candidate 
received 
votes 
Precisely 2 
candidates 
received 
votes 
Effective 
number of 
candidates 
Precisely 1 
candidate 
received 
votes 
Precisely 2 
candidates 
received 
votes 
Effective 
number of 
parties in 
chamber 
0.28 
(0.73) 
-1.03 
(0.50) 
-0.18 
(0.32) 
-0.31 
(0.53) 
-2.31 
(0.91) 
-0.58 
(0.38) 
Party 
convention 
endorsement 
-0.90 
(1.24) 
-5.33 
—a 
0.40 
(0.55) 
-0.63 
(0.87) 
-3.68 
—a 
0.88 
(0.56) 
Direct 
primary 
endorsement 
-1.22 
(0.80) 
0.73 
(0.41) 
-0.14 
(0.36) 
-1.10 
(0.56) 
1.47 
(0.64) 
0.03 
(0.38) 
(Pseudo) R2 .09 .40 .13 .11 .68 .19 
LLF — -42.9 -104.3 — -17.2 -89.4 
N 171 176 175 168 172 172 
Method Regression Probit Probit Regression Probit Probit 
 
Note:  Separate state dummies and intercept not reported. 
 
aStandard error cannot be computed because the independent variable perfectly predicts values of 
the dependent variable. 
 
